Abstract-High performance computing (HPC) systems frequently suffer errors and failures from hardware components that negatively impact the performance of jobs run on these systems. We analyzed system logs from two HPC systems at Purdue University and created statistical models for memory and hard disk errors. We created a small-scale error injection testbed-using a customized QEMU build, libvirt, and Pythonthat could be used by HPC application programmers to test and debug their programs in a faulty environment so that programmers can write more robust and resilient programs before deploying them on an actual HPC system.
I. INTRODUCTION
High performance computing (HPC) systems are a major component of academic and industrial scientific research, and the reliability of these systems is one of the foremost areas of research in the HPC community. The HPC community is continually trying to make larger, more powerful HPC systems, and the poor reliability of commodity HPC clusters is one of the biggest hindrances to the adoption of petascale and exascale computing systems.
This study examined the system logs of large-scale HPC systems operated by the Rosen Center for Advanced Computing (RCAC) at Purdue University. The systems studied are all commodity-based computing clusters running Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL). This study determined the frequency at which component failures occurred and produced statistical models of the recorded failure events. The statistical models were used as the driving input to a synthetic fault generator that simulated hardware failures within a virtual machine environment.
Large-scale high performance computing (HPC) systems are affected by low reliability caused by frequent component failures of commodity hardware. Due to the series reliability model, increasing the number of nodes or processors in an HPC cluster reduces the overall reliability of the whole cluster. This results in frequent failures that hinder the performance and scalability of large-scale systems.
The work in this paper, based on the thesis of the first author [1] , describes a small-scale fault injection system based on system logs from real HPC systems under a typical workload that are used to emulate failures on a VM-level to create a simulation of a faulty cluster for a testbed for parallel applications. This would allow parallel application developers to test their code's robustness and tolerance of node failures in a small-scale environment that replicates some of the failure patterns of large-scale systems. Researchers would be able to submit more fault-tolerant parallel applications to large-scale HPC systems first, instead of submitting jobs that have not been properly tested for robustness and resilience.
II. RELATED WORK

A. HPC System Reliability
Improving the reliability of high performance computing (HPC) systems is one of the leading research areas in the HPC field. Many studies have been performed that have covered various methods for understanding how, why, and when failures occur in large-scale HPC systems [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] .
HPC system logs are in invaluable tool for studying ways of improving the reliability of HPC systems. Unfortunately, the system logs on HPC systems are frequently of poor quality-vague, cryptic, not easily machine parsible, etc.-which necessitates significant processing to produce useful data. A notable flaw in the 2.6.18 version of the Linux kernelthe same kernel version used in Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 5-prevents the most severe of hardware failures from being logged at all [2] . This further complicates system log analysis on clusters running RHEL 5.
Zheng et al. [7] presented a framework for pre-processing HPC system logs to make these logs better suited for statistical analysis and failure prediction. The framework consists of three components: 1) classifying messages by type and severity 2) removing temporal and spatial clustering of repeated messages for the same event 3) identifying causal relationships between system log messages to better identify symptomatic messages Zheng et al. stated that their framework improved failure prediction over the incumbent mechanism by 20% to 170%.
Salfner & Tschirpke [3] proposed a set of techniques for processing the system logs of a commercial telecommunication system, and their techniques consisted of the following:
• clustering related error messages • "a statistical noise filtering algorithm" Salfner & Tschirpke stated that their techniques significantly improved upon other failure prediction methods, and the authors concluded that appropriate pre-processing of the system logs is vital for producing useful data.
Hacker, Romero, & Carothers [4] concluded in their analysis of system logs from two large IBM Blue Gene systems that system log messages show significant spatial and temporal clustering, that the failure events rate varies in time following the Weibull distribution, and that the health and reliability of individual computational nodes can be estimated by system log analysis.
B. Error Injection
Several error and fault injection systems have been developed previously.
Giuffrida, Kuijsten, & Tanenbaum [14] created a fault injection tool for software programs. Their system injects software faults in a controlled manner and "offers strong guarantees" that attempted software fault injections do not cause unintended side effects that could undermine the results. However, their approach requires that changes be made to the tested software at compile-time or using a disassembler if source code is not available.
Guan et al. [15] created a fault injector tool that uses the QEMU virtual machine and can precisely target programs running inside a VM. Their system is intended for introducing errors in software programs by modifying the program's memory by exploiting how QEMU translates virtual machine instructions between the guest and host systems. Their system exploits the Tiny Code Generation (TCG) system used by QEMU and "translates" the intended VM instructions to corrupted ones before the host executes them.
Error injection into virtual machines has been investigated previously by DeBardeleben et al. [5] , who introduced a framework for injecting errors that evaluates the "resilience" of parallel applications to such errors. The approach DeBardeleben et al. took is targeted solely at causing faults inside the application's memory.
Levy et al. [16] created a VM-based fault injection tool using the Palacios virtual machine monitor [17] , which is a VMM developed for HPC systems. Their approach injects memory errors at specific memory locations and IDE disk errors at the VM level. Their method of injecting errors differs from our approach due to differences in the hypervisor and due to our approach being more generalized and not necessitating physical memory or disk addresses.
The work in this paper is evaluated by testing the injection of machine checks and simulation of disk failures into a virtual cluster-in other words, causing the virtual hardware to experience similar failures and errors as those observed in real system logs under typical workloads. The work in this paper uses libvirt [18] -a virtualization API-and a customized modified version of QEMU to inject errors into the virtual hardware which causes the virtual machine to detect and report these errors using the inherent failure detection mechanisms within the OS.
Our approach differs from Guiffrida, Kuijsten, & Tanenbaum [14] , Guan et al. [15] , and DeBardeleben et al. [5] by simulating errors at the virtual hardware level and using the inherent failure detection mechanisms within the OS to detect the errors. Our approach improves upon the work by Levy et al. [16] by triggering whole-disk errors which ensures that errors are always detected given some disk activity, supporting a larger array of memory and disk error types, and by using a mainstream virtual machine monitor in QEMU-a key easeof-use requirement for a testbed system not intended to be deployed on real HPC systems, and therefore not bound by the same performance requirements of real HPC jobs.
III. METHODOLOGY
This study was a quantitative research analysis of system logs from real HPC systems. This study created statistical models of component failures within the systems and used the models to simulate failure events on virtual machines. The virtual machines experienced failures similar to those found in the logs from real HPC systems.
A. Data Sets
Memory error log data was taken from system logs from the 993-node Coates system [19] Hard disk error log data was taken from system logs from the 660-node Carter system [20] operated by RCAC at Purdue University. The logs analyzed ranged from 2012-11-25 to 2013-08-31.
The Coates and Carter systems were operating under typical HPC workloads throughout the log collection period. This makes the analyzed log data generalizable to other large-scale systems operating under workload.
B. Overview of Statistical Model Creation
This section provides an overview of the steps taken to create the statistical models. This is provided to assist other researchers who may be interested in creating statistical models for errors on other systems.
The system logs for each system were collected in a central location and were stripped of personally-identifiable information prior to the beginning of this study.
The following list provides a high-level overview of the procedure.
1) Error discovery 2) Error filtering 3) Error sorting 4) Log message timestamp sanitization 5) Scatter plot creation to identify clustering of errors 6) Declustering data using k-means 7) Fitting distributions to the data 8) Selecting a model from the fitted distributions Manual searching of the system logs was performed using grep with regular expressions to look for anomalous log events. Error messages of interest were then filtered out from the rest of the logs and sorted based on the type of error. Due to poor quality timestamps of the Coates system logs, these timestamps had to be corrected prior to further processing.
Scatter plots were made of the error event data to identify the severity of clustering. We then declustered the data using k-means cluster analysis. The declustered data was loaded into the distribution fitting software, EasyFit [21] . Finally, the continuous statistical distributions with the best fit were selected as our models.
C. System Log Analysis
The system logs were manually examined to determine the key phrases within the logs related to failure events of memory and hard disks. The logs were searched using a grep regular expression like the one below:
grep -Ei error messages * The system logs from Coates needed significant processing to improve the quality of message timestamps. The system logs from Carter did not need any notable processing.
1) Coates: Log Processing and Sorting:
The logs were filtered so that only failure-event-related messages were kept. The logs were further processed to identify specific failure messages and were sorted by those messages.
We investigated general errors detected by the integrated memory controller-an external memory controller is called a northbridge, but this distinction is not made in the system logs. The "BIOS and Kernel Developer's Guide for AMD Athlon 64 and Opteron Processors" states that these errors include errors in the GART TLB cache, errors in the HyperTransport link, or errors in DRAM [22] . It should be noted that the RHEL kernel version 2.6.18-194.17.1.el5 disables GART TLB error reporting by default. The "node" and "core" values mentioned below refer to the physical CPU package (i.e. socket) and the CPU core number within the physical CPU package, respectively. Because the Coates cluster is built entirely of dual-socket, quad-core AMD Opteron processors, the only valid values for "node" are 0 and 1, and the only valid values for "core" are 0, 1, 2, and 3.
The regular expression used to match these errors is kernel:. The timestamps in the Coates logs were changed from the default BSD-style syslog format, specified in RFC 3164, to the Unix epoch format for easier machine processing. Table I compares the differences between the easily human-readable ISO 8601 and BSD-style syslog formats and the easily machine-readable Unix epoch format for a sample from the Coates system logs. For the BSD-style syslog format, the year was determined based on log file metadata because the year is not included in these timestamps.
3) Coates: Node ID Standardization: To look for temporal and spatial clustering of events, we created a scatter plot to investigate the degree of clustering. To plot the nodes on the horizontal axis, the nodes were assigned unique IDs based on their IP addresses.
The unique node IDs were generated based on the compute node's IP address. The IP address was converted from dotted decimal notation, e.g. 192.168.15.76, into its packed, 32-bit, binary format represented as a decimal, e.g. 3232239436. Sequential node IDs were then generated by sorted the decimalbased node IDs. The data set, composed of unique node IDs and the message timestamps of failure events, was plotted as a scatter plot with the node IDs sorted from smallest to largest along the horizontal axis and the event timestamps plotted along the vertical axis. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of memory failure event times plotted against node IDs.
4) Coates: Scatter Plots of Memory Failure Events:
5) Coates: Declustering of Failure Events:
Notable temporal and spatial clustering of events was found in the data set, as shown in Figure 1 . 1 The temporal and spatial clustering of Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of hard disk failure event times plotted against node IDs. 7) Carter: Declustering of Failure Events: Notable temporal and spatial clustering of events was found in the data set, as shown in Figure 2 . We declustered the events for hard disk errors using the R statistical software [24] . The "neural gas" k-means algorithm was used from the "cclust" package in R. The number of centers was chosen by locating the "elbow" of the plot of within groups sum of squared error (WSSE) versus the number of centers. WSSE is a measure of the accuracy of the k-means fit. WSSE is the sum of the distance squared between data points and their assigned cluster. When the slope of a polynomial fitted to a plot of the WSSE vs. the number of centers approaches 0, then the optimum number of centers has been found because increasing the number of centers does not lower WSSE any further.
8) Distribution Fitting:
The declustered data sets for Coates and Carter were then input into MathWave's EasyFit software for distribution fitting [21] . The fit process was run using a continuous data domain of the time between events data. The distributions with the best goodness of fit results were chosen.
D. Fault Injection
We created a Python 3 script that can inject arbitrary machine checks into VMs and simulate hard disk failures for virtual disk drives. Machine checks were injected using QEMU's built-in Human Monitor Protocol [25] . Hard disk errors were simulated using modified VirtIO SCSI drivers for QEMU [26] . The script has a multi-threaded design that allows for an arbitrary number of VMs to be supported. When an error is about to be injected, the script randomly selects the VM in which to inject the error from a preconfigured list of VMs.
1) Memory Error Injection Procedure:
Arbitrary memory errors are injected using QEMU's Human Monitor Protocol (HMP). The HMP has various commands that can be executed via libvirt's "virsh" tool. One of these commands is the mce command that sets the values of the virtual CPU's MCi STATUS and related registers. These registers control the Machine Check Architecture (MCA) subsystem of the processor, which is used for memory and processor error detection and reporting.
For example, running the following command will inject an ECC error overflow with a valid address into CPU 0 bank 4 of domain 12:
virsh -c qemu:///system qemu-monitor-command 12 --hmp --cmd 'mce 0 4 0xd426c0010b000813 0x0 0x0 0x0 ' 2) Machine Check Registers: The memory error messages analyzed were composed of errors detected in the on-die northbridge of the systems' AMD processors. These memory errors are handled by the processor's Machine Check Architecture, which contains several registers indicating the type of error detected by the processor. The MCi STATUS register is the register that reports the error detected. The underlying bit patterns of the MCi STATUS register were determined through information obtained from AMD's system programming manuals [27] , [22] , the Linux kernel documentation [28] , and the RHEL kernel's source code [29] . The bit patterns required to inject the observed failure events were recorded and added to the fault injection system.
3) Memory Error Injection Strings:
The fault injection system supports injecting ten types of memory errors. Table II documents the supported memory errors. Uncorrectable errors are indicated by "(UE)". Overflow errors occur when more than one machine check occurs within the machine check polling interval. 
4) QEMU Modifications and Hard Disk Error Simulation
Procedure: QEMU does not support disk error injection by default. We modified the source file hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c from QEMU version 2.0.0 to support disk error injection via the VirtIO SCSI subsystem. When a hard disk error is triggered and detected, the VM's SCSI driver skips to its built-in error handling code and propagates the error to the rest of the system using the OS's inherent failure detection mechanisms.
Hard disk errors are injected by the existence of a file under a directory tree containing MAC addresses that map the errors to specific VMs. For example, the existence of the following file will simulate the error ENOMEDIUM for the VM with MAC address 52:54:00:39:ca:8b:
/tmp/qemu-disk-inject/52:54:00:39:ca:8b/ ENOMEDIUM
The Flexible I/O Tester (fio) [30] was used to simulate a light disk I/O workload on the VMs. This ensures that the injected errors are recognized by QEMU and the guest OS.
5) Hard Disk Errors:
The fault injection system supports injecting four types of hard disk errors; however, only the errors ENOMEM, ENOMEDIUM, and EINVAL were used for the simulations. Injecting the error ENOSPC immediately suspends the VM, making this error not suitable for simulations. These four errors are all of the errors supported by QEMU. Table III documents The script supports tunable fault injection frequency. The statistical distributions from EasyFit were mathematically analyzed to allow for arbitrary changes to the expected values of the distributions. The scale parameters to the distributions were made variable, via an inverse multiplier term, to provide a desired increase or decrease in the frequency of failure events, similar to a tuning knob.
7) Tuning the Three-Parameter Weibull Distribution: Integrated memory controller errors on the Coates system followed a three-parameter Weibull distribution with the parameters found in Table IV . The expected value of the three-parameter Weibull distribution is shown in Equation 1 , where Γ is the Gamma function, γ is the shape parameter, α is the scale parameter, and μ is the location parameter, according to NIST [31] .
Rearranging the terms of Equation 1 gives a formula for an alternate scale parameter with an inverse multiplier term, as shown in Equation 2 , where E[X] is the expected value and β is the multiplier.
8) Tuning the Lomax Distribution:
Hard disk errors on the Carter system followed a Lomax distribution-Pareto Type II distribution that starts at 0-with the parameters found in Table V . The expected value of the Lomax distribution is shown in Equation 3 , where λ is the scale parameter, and α is the shape parameter.
Rearranging the terms of Equation 3 gives a formula for an alternate scale parameter with an inverse multiplier term, as shown in Equation 4 , where E[X] is the expected value and β is the multiplier.
9) Experimental Setup:
The fitted distributions were then used as input for the fault injection script to inject errors with the same statistical distributions observed in the Coates and Carter logs.
The testbed server is a custom-built, dual-socket Intel Xeon X5650 system with 24 cores and 36 GiB of DDR3 memory. The stock QEMU package was installed, and our custom QEMU was compiled and installed manually into /usr/local/bin
The stock QEMU executable was backed up, and a symlink was created to our custom QEMU executable from /usr/libexec/qemu-kvm
We added the SELinux tag qemu_exec_t to the custom QEMU executable for SELinux compatibility. Eight QEMU-KVM virtual machines were created on the testbed server. Using "virt-manager", we changed their SCSI controller type from "hypervisor default" to "VirtIO SCSI", and we changed the disk bus to "SCSI" with a "raw" storage format. The server and its eight VMs run CentOS 7.2 without a GUI.
mcelog [32] was installed on the guest VMs to decode the injected machine checks. The Flexible I/O Tester (fio) [30] was configured as a workload generator on all eight VMs. fio has been configured in time-based mode scheduled for a two month duration using the Intel IOMeter File Server Access Pattern job configured with a "linear" I/O depth. A systemd service file was created to start the fio service at boot and to automatically restart on service failure. The eight VMs were configured to forward their system logs to a centralized server for easy log collection and monitoring.
IV. STATISTICAL MODELS
This section describes the statistical models for failure events observed in the Coates and Carter data sets. 
A. Coates: Memory Errors
Integrated memory controller errors on the Coates system followed a three-parameter Weibull distribution with the parameters found in Table IV . This correlates with the results from Hacker, Romero, & Carothers [4] that also showed a Weibull distribution fits well with failure events.
B. Carter: Hard Disk Errors
Hard disk errors on the Carter system followed a Lomax distribution (Pareto Type II that starts at 0) with the parameters found in Table V . This correlates with the results from Schroeder, Damouras, & Gill [33] that also showed a Pareto distribution is the best fit for disk errors.
V. EXPERIMENTS
This section contains the results of the experimental setup.
A. System Log Samples
This section contains system log samples from the VMs running under the fault injection script. A sample of the logs generated from a VM that experiences a fault injection is shown in Figure 3 . 
B. Quantitative Results
This section contains quantitative results from the experiments comparing the number of attempted fault injections versus the number of faults the guest OS of the VMs reported.
Over a 7-day time period, 15,644 total faults were randomly injected across the eight VMs. Table VI shows the number of attempted injections, the number of successful injections, and an adjusted number of injections that accounts for duplicates. We found that when multiple disk errors were injected per minute via QEMU into the VM, Linux running within the VM could not detect each individual injected error due to factors such as the inability of Linux to quickly recover from a failed disk within a very short time. The exploration of the response of Linux to disk errors is outside the scope of this paper. The adjusted value was tabulated by examining the logs on a per-VM basis and using a sliding window of one minute. When multiple disk errors occurred within one minute of each other, the first error time was noted and one minute was added to this time; any errors that occurred within this window were marked as successful and tabulated under the adjusted column. The values for ENOMEM and EINVAL have higher adjusted values than errors attempted due to uncertainty in how big this sliding window must be. From this data, 99.7% of disk errors were successfully injected; 100% of memory errors were successfully injected; and 99.99% of all total errors were successfully injected.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have processed and analyzed system log data from two high performance computing clusters running typical HPC workloads operated by the Rosen Center for Advanced Computing at Purdue University. We have produced statistical models of some of the hardware errors in these systems. We have developed a fault injection testbed that, in virtual machines, injects/simulates real hardware errors using the same statistical models we produced from these computing clusters.
As seen in the raw injection data, a number of attempted disk error injections did not succeed. We found that hard disk errors cannot be reliably injected with a time between errors of some time under one minute. After examining the data, most of these failed error injections can be accounted for with multiple injections in short succession before the virtual machines were able to recover from previous failures. We postulate this is because the workload generator crashes at every hard disk injection, and the generator needs time to restart itself fully, along with the normal hard disk recovery procedures.
The statistical models we created are broadly applicable due to the high quality of the source data-large-scale HPC systems running typical workloads for long durations. HPC system logs of production systems under workload are rarely made available to researchers so we believe these statistical models will be useful for other researchers and system administrators that do not have access to such data.
The fault injection system we created is useful for parallel application developers and system administrators who want to test their application's robustness to hardware errors. Parallel application developers can test how their programs respond to errors in main memory and CPU caches, which is especially useful for highly optimized programs designed to stay in the CPU caches. Additionally, system administrators can test before deploying to production the ways in which arbitrary web applications, customer-facing web portals like Internetbased stores, high availability software, etc. respond to failing hardware that could interrupt business functions or result in lost revenue.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
For future work, we recommend further analysis of the Rosen Center's cluster data sets for other hardware error types and generate more statistical models for these errors. We also recommend working with the QEMU project maintainers to create a built-in mechanism for hard disk error injection. Finally, we recommend extending this work by investigating error prediction based on prior hardware errors.
